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Chapter 8




In Europe and North America, boundaries of belonging—the abstract lines that 
define the limit of an ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1983) – seem to be drawn 
through new frames of deservingness (Chauvin and Garcés-Mascareñas 2014; Faist 
2013; Soysal 2012). Recent research shows that the country of origin becomes sec-
ondary in the determination of whether or not an individual can become part of 
society and is gradually being replaced by his or her perceived economic utility and 
ability to actively participate in society.
While the main debate around this issue takes place in North America and Europe 
today, the reframing of the categories of immigrant settling in Israel is relatively 
absent in the scientific immigration debate. Indeed, the strong ethnonational ideol-
ogy underlying the Law of Return – Israel’s national immigration policy – and the 
stability of this policy over time, leaves questions of belonging unchallenged. 
However, I argue that several changes have taken place since the Law of Return was 
promulgated in 1950 and I scrutinise their impact on immigrant integration frames 
in this chapter.
First of all, Israel’s immigration landscape is beginning to resemble that of cer-
tain post-industrial countries (Berthomière 1996, 2004; Elias and Kemp 2010). The 
beneficiaries of the Law of Return have become more ethnically diverse and the 
large immigration flows from the former Soviet Union and Ethiopia, in particular, 
have raised new questions of race and religion (Yonah 2005). The globalisation of 
Israel’s economy has led to the entry of a non-Jewish workforce from Asia and 
Eastern Europe, within the frame of a policy that resembles the guest-worker pro-
grammes implemented by several European countries after World War 
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II. Additionally, Israel has seen an increase in the number of asylum-seekers whose 
presence is criminalised by the Government.1
Secondly, Israel’s semi-socialist economy has experienced a drastic shift towards 
neoliberalism, as exemplified by deregulation, privatisation and the increasing with-
drawal of the welfare state, in parallel with the adoption of a free market economy, 
the growing prestige of business careers and so on. Although Israel is still character-
ised by a somewhat centralised administration, municipalities take on more and 
more responsibilities towards their residents and the future development of the local 
economy.
In this context, I focus on one type of immigration  – Jewish immigration as 
framed by the Law of Return – and the growing role of municipalities in their inte-
gration. This chapter aims to determine the extent to which urban logics under neo-
liberal reforms reframe immigrant ‘deservingness’ (Chauvin and Garcés-Mascareñas 
2014). Has the ‘economic utility’ (Faist 2013) of Jewish immigrants become a new 
criterion determining the efforts which local governments put into attracting certain 
new immigrants while dissuading others?
The main objective is therefore to unpack the immigrant policies of Israel, as 
they are interpreted and adapted at the municipal level. A substantial aspect of the 
changes I detail below lies in the tensions between new frames of deservingness and 
persisting ethnonational state logics. It is not the first time in history that Israel has 
limited the immigration of Jews in favour of categories perceived as more desirable. 
However, the political and socioeconomic context has seen the emergence of new 
frames through which these categories are justified. This chapter contributes to the 
developing scholarship on deservingness by reconnecting neoliberalisation pro-
cesses at the global level with national identity politics and micro-processes of 
change produced at the local level. Confronting global, national and local frames 
therefore sheds light on how disintegration, as a process of latent (or sometimes 
even intentional) exclusion of certain groups, takes place and affects society as a 
whole (see Collyer et al. 2020).
The chapter is based on a research conducted in four peripheral cities in Israel 
from 2013 to 2017. It is organised as follows: firstly, I define the concepts of desir-
ability and deservingness that underlie immigrant policies. Secondly, I address the 
history of the ‘absorption’ of Jewish immigrants, concomitant to nation-building in 
Israel. Immigrant absorption has changed, together with the neoliberalisation of the 
country, which has introduced tensions between the state, the city and the immi-
grants. Focusing on local immigration and integration policies formed by Israeli 
cities’ municipalities, I show how ethnonational and neoliberal logics are inter-
twined  – in fact, my enquiry reveals the tensions resulting from national ethnic 
preference on the one hand and economic desirability as pushed forward at munici-
pal level on the other. To conclude, I compare my empirical results with the desir-
able versus deserving debate, observed under neoliberalisation processes.
1 In this chapter, Government with a capital letter refers to the central administration, including its 
elected officials and its managerial and technical agents.
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8.2  Immigrant Integration: Desirability 
Versus Deservingness
Immigration and citizenship policies are the set of rules that fix access to a national 
territory and its formal membership. Therefore, scholars who attempt to unpack 
immigration policies often focus on the underlying logics determining who can be 
part of the national community and who cannot. While some nation-states prevent 
access to formal membership entirely if the applicant cannot prove ethnic ascen-
dency (jus sanguinis), others permit access to formal membership to any individual 
born within the boundaries of the country (jus solis), even when s/he cannot prove 
his or her ethnic ascendency. In the second case, membership may be granted with 
the condition of quick assimilation into the polity or following a more pluralist 
attitude.
However, over recent decades, the entangled processes of globalisation, expanded 
free market economy and rescaling of governance have greatly challenged nation- 
states’ management of these issues (Glick Schiller and Salazar 2013; Sassen 2005). 
The heterogeneity of immigrant situations and the concomitant heterogeneity of 
regulations and policies have led to a rather fragmented management of immigra-
tion, which even includes the deliberate undermining of integration processes 
(Collyer et al. 2020). Additionally, economic criteria have gained substantial weight 
in determining the desirability of certain individuals (immigrants or not) over oth-
ers. Immigration becomes an important stake for the globalised market economy, 
and ‘immigration policy – the power of the state to exclude, admit, and expel – is 
productively deployed not only as a tool of statecraft but as a tool for neoliberal 
capital accumulation via the constitution of neoliberal subjects’ (Varsanyi 2008, 
p. 883).
Whereas ‘migrants contribute to neoliberal governance by encouraging a form of 
subjectivity that reinforces the ethos of the self-reliant, enterprising individual’ 
(Glick Schiller and Çağlar 2010, p. 16), they face the increasing requirement that 
they take responsibility for their own integration, including continuous training and 
proactive integration in the labour market, in order to be recognised as ‘active, par-
ticipatory and productive citizens’ (Soysal 2012). This injunction falls particularly 
on immigrants but is also increasingly true for all citizens (see also Karolak 2020; 
Samuk 2020). As Thomas Faist points out: ‘It is not only the categorization of peo-
ple along nationality/citizenship and thus the accident of birthplace, but also their 
distinction with respect to economic utility and social adaptation that make a differ-
ence to the life chances of many individuals’ (Faist 2013, p. 1644).
In this context of tensions between globalisation and neoliberalisation on the one 
hand and the trends of nationalism and the militarisation of borders on the other, the 
tendency of nation-states is to ‘leav[e] the messy and costly details of servicing and 
policing expanding noncitizen populations to state2 and local governments’ 
(Varsanyi 2008, p. 879). Indeed, local governments – such as municipalities – have 
2 In this case, regional and not federal state.
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been recognised as emerging actors in the governance of immigration. More than a 
merely pragmatic response to immigrants’ settlement in their cities, municipalities 
are forced to respond to the demographic changes. As Neil Brenner argues, post- 
Keynesian competition states mobilise diverse institutional realignments and regu-
latory strategies to ‘[enhance] fiscal constraints and competitive pressures upon 
cities and regions, impelling their regulatory institutions to privilege the goals of 
local economic development and territorial competitiveness over traditional wel-
farist, redistributive priorities’ (Brenner 2004, p. 176).
Sometimes, ‘interlocality competition’ (Brenner 2004) has permitted a more 
positive embracing of the settlement of foreign-born populations in cities. In fact, 
municipalities increasingly tend to consider immigration as a potential catalyst for 
city development. Immigrants are seen as potential members of the ‘creative class’ 
(Florida 2003) or – formulated from a more critical perspective – as the neoliberal 
agents of urban restructuring (Glick Schiller and Çağlar 2010). Municipalities 
engaged in ‘remaking, reimagining and marketing’ their city (ibid., p.  2) favour 
immigrants whom they perceive as having more to contribute. Martin Jorgensen, 
when studying this issue in Denmark, states: ‘Cities compete to attract the most 
skilled and creative migrants, and the [rural] municipalities are responsible for 
poorly skilled and less resourceful immigrants and descendants’ (Jørgensen 2012, 
p. 245).
However, empirically, municipal policies include immigrants with very hetero-
geneous social and human capital and therefore very differently perceived probabil-
ities of succeeding in integrating autonomously into the various institutions of the 
host country. ‘Sanctuary cities’ (see Hinger 2020) have developed access to local 
membership and sets of integration policies for immigrants of all backgrounds, 
including those with precarious or no legal status. An interesting contribution to our 
understanding of who is perceived as deserving is that of Sébastien Chauvin and 
Blanca Garcés-Mascareñas (2012, 2014). In their analyses, immigrants gain the 
attention of policymakers when their economic performance is positive, when they 
actively participate in the community or when they fall into the category of vulner-
ability. The last category, vulnerability, is often offered by the state in exchange for 
the migrant’s renunciation of agency in the process of proving his vulnerability. In 
other words, the denial of agency is artificial and, on the contrary, produces self- 
narratives that respond to the state’s expectations of passive victims.
This chapter brings empirical grounding to this debate: the case of Israel presents 
a strong ethnonational definition of belonging and access to citizenship. However, 
with the recent involvement of municipalities, new tensions appear which may lead 
to further instability in immigration policymaking. My objective is to analyse the 




8.3  The Absorption of Jewish Immigrants 
and Nation-Building
The Law of Return, ratified by the Israeli parliament in 1950, is Israel’s only immi-
gration policy. It is conceived not only as a return migration policy but also as an 
immigrant settlement policy. Indeed, it states that every Jew who expresses the 
desire to immigrate to Israel, identified as the ‘ancestral homeland’, can do so. As 
the Israeli sociologists Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled state, ‘[The Law of Return] 
became the most important legal expression of Israel’s self-definition as a Jewish 
state. It established an ethno-nationalist citizenship that, in principle, encompassed 
all Jews, and only Jews, by virtue of their ethnic descent’ (Shafir and Peled 2004). 
In 1952, the state ratified a second law, the Nationality Law, granting beneficiaries 
of the Law of Return immediate access to Israeli citizenship.
From the beginning and despite the all-encompassing framing of the Law of 
Return, immigration to Israel and integration after settlement never included all 
Jews equally. The first waves of immigrants who settled in Ottoman Palestine had to 
prove their capacity to sustain themselves, without the support of Zionist institu-
tions (Shilo 1994). ‘Penniless Jews’ were prevented from immigrating and the ideal 
newcomer was young, able to work and had at least a small amount of capital. 
Zionist organisations revised the rescuing/refuge purpose of the settlement in 
Palestine and advised the careful, organised building of the settlement (ibid.). The 
first organised immigration of ‘penniless’ Yemenite Jews occurred in 1911 but was 
of equal ‘economic value’ (ibid., p. 611) since their settlement was meant to replace 
that of Arab labourers and provide a cheap Jewish labour force in Palestine (ibid.).
In 1948, Israel declared itself open to the mass migration of Jews in the Diaspora 
but, following the arrival of more than 687,000 Jewish immigrants between the 
second half of 1948 and the end of 1951 (CBS 2016), the Government and its opera-
tive arm, the Jewish Agency, had to rethink their plan. In 1952, the Government and 
the Jewish Agency both stopped supporting immigration unless applicants were 
under 35 or were refugees in immediate danger (Sitton 1962). Candidates for immi-
gration who were not ‘desirable’ as workers nor ‘deserving’ in the context of the 
establishment of Israel as a haven for threatened Jews in the Diaspora had to bear 
the cost of their immigration and settlement themselves.
For those who made it to the country, equal integration into the new nation was 
far from a reality. In fact, the absorption policy – the set of policies governing immi-
grants’ settlement in Israel – was conceived along a two-path ethnicised integration 
approach. Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt, founder of the Israeli School of Sociology and 
its leader until the 1970s, had developed the basis of the state immigration policy. 
As stated in the introduction to this volume, the role of academia in influencing poli-
tics of (dis)integration is clear to see (Collyer et al. 2020). Hence, Eisenstadt (1954) 
suggests that: ‘To each aliya3 is assigned a specific functional contribution in the 
nation-building process and a consequent location on the centre-periphery 
3 A Hebrew term meaning ascent and referring to Jewish immigration to Israel.
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 continuum’ (Ram 1995, p. 31). In Eisenstadt’s model, immigration from the end of 
the nineteenth century represents the core of the ‘social system’ necessary for mod-
ernisation, while the mass migration of the 1950s represents the periphery. The 
‘centre’ is ethnically Russian and Polish and bears the universal interests of society 
at large whereas the periphery is mostly made up of non-European Jews from Africa 
and Asia. As such, the latter has a marginal role in nation-building: its members are 
meant to be assimilated within the core culture in order to create a ‘unified and 
homogeneous nation’ (Frankenstein 1953, cited by Ram 1995, p. 38).
Eisenstadt (1954) viewed three aspects of the successful transformation of ‘tra-
ditional’ immigrants into ‘modern Jews’:
Acculturation – learning of the various norms, roles, and customs of the absorbing society; 
personal adjustment – strengthening of the mental makeup of the immigrants, building con-
fidence and satisfaction in them; and institutional dispersion – the proportional dispersion 
of immigrants in the various institutional spheres, residential locations, and so forth 
(Eisenstadt 1954, pp. 10, 15).
Absorption was designated in terms of the ‘diffusion’ of values, norms, and roles, 
from the modern absorbing society to the traditional immigrants, until they were 
entirely immersed (ibid., p. 38).
‘The proportional dispersion of immigrants in the various institutional spheres, 
residential locations, and so forth’ (Eisenstadt 1954, pp. 10, 15) refers to an actual 
geographical dispersion of immigrants (Lipshitz 1991). In fact, the central adminis-
tration planned the establishment of new cities called development towns, located at 
the frontiers of the new state. With the saturation of older urban centres, new immi-
grants from Africa and Asia4 were forced to settle in development towns.
Non-European Jews were therefore doubly excluded from the core of the new 
nation. Socio-culturally, they were considered as peripheral and needing to integrate 
within Ashkenazi5 modern society in order to differentiate themselves from the 
Arab culture6 (Chetrit 2000; Ram 2000; Smooha and Peretz 1982; Tzfadia and 
Yacobi 2011; Yiftachel 2000). Geographically, they were directed to the borders, 
where they suffered effective segregation on the part of the state (Khazzoom 2005; 
Lipshitz 1991, 1998; Shama and Iris 1977; Tzfadia 2006; Yiftachel 2000).
The resentment of African and Asian immigrants from development towns and 
peripheral neighbourhoods in larger cities grew when Soviet Jews entered Israel in 
the 1970s. Associated with national political crises (which I describe in the next 
section), the preferential treatment given to these new immigrants exacerbated the 
divide and led to social unrest. A socio-political movement emerged in that period 
and African and Asian immigrants gathered around a Mizrahi7 identity. The 
4 Immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe were also directed towards development towns; 
however, due to their better social networks and higher levels of capital, they could re-emigrate to 
the centre quite shortly after their arrival.
5 Ashkenazi means Jew of European origin.
6 Even though I refer to ‘African and Asian Jews”, the majority of these immigrants came from 
North Africa and the Middle East, where they had co-habited with Muslim and Christian Arabs in 
Morocco, Yemen, Libya, Egypt and Lebanon etc. – a minority came from India, for instance.
7 A Hebrew term meaning Easterner.
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Ashkenazi–Mizrahi divide was reinforced again 20 years later with the fall of the 
USSR, when more than 800,000 Former Soviet Union immigrants made their way 
to Israel between 1989 and 2000 (Berthomière 2004).
The ‘Russians’ were not the only ones who alimented the Ashkenazi–Mizrahi 
gap. At the other end of the spectrum, Israel received a new group of racialised 
immigrants: Ethiopian Jews (Anteby 1998; Djerrahian 2015; Elias and Kemp 2010). 
Thirty years after Governmental operations to bring them to Israel, Ethiopian Jews8 
still suffer from high rates of poverty, lower achievement in the education system 
and the labour market, institutional racism and more. At the time of my fieldwork 
(2015–2016), as European Jewish communities were increasingly afraid of becom-
ing the target of terrorist attacks, following those in France and beyond, the state 
once more privileged Western immigrants over the settlement of new Ethiopian 
immigrants, triggering protests among Ethiopian Israelis (Lior 2016; Lis 2016).
Whether it be the prevention of ‘penniless Jews’ from settling during the pre- 
state period, the differentiated immigration possibilities of (perceived)  non- 
productive, non-refugee Jews in the 1950s or the preferential immigration of 
‘Western’ Ashkenazi immigrants over ‘Eastern’ Mizrahi immigrants today, Jews 
who should have benefitted from the support of the state have been categorised 
either as economically useful or as vulnerable refugees for more than a century. 
However, this distinction has taken a new turn since the late 1970s and the neoliber-
alisation at work in Israel.
8.4  Towards Neoliberalisation: Tensions Between the State, 
the City and the Immigrants
The 1970s represented an important rupture for the state and the beginning of the 
progressive liberalisation of Israel’s economy and politics. In the 1970s, Israel saw 
the infiltration of a ‘new right’ ideology from the UK and the USA (Kay 2012). In 
1977, Likud rose to power in the Israeli parliament and Menachem Begin became 
Prime Minister. In fact, the 1973 war and the growing resentment among African 
and Asian immigrants led to the delegitimation of the Mapai (Labour) camp.9 This 
8 Between November 1984 and January 1985, 7000 Beta Israel or Ethiopian Jews were transferred 
to Israel during the so-called ‘Moses operation’. Even though 6000 Ethiopian Jews had already 
made it to Israel before them, this first operation heralds the symbolic start of Ethiopian immigra-
tion to Israel. 11,000 new Ethiopian immigrants arrived in Israel after this operation. Lastly, in 
May 1991, Israel conducted the second operation, the ‘Solomon operation”, an airlift which 
brought 14,300 Ethiopian Jews to Israel in 36 h (Anteby 1998; Berthomière 1996).
9 The Mapai (an acronym for the Party of Eretz Israel Workers), led by David Ben-Gurion, domi-
nated Israeli politics from 1949 to 1968 and instituted a semi-socialist economy in Israel, charac-
terised by a centralised planned economy, the monopoly of state corporations such as the 
construction company Solel Bone, the housing company Amidar and the national Union Histadrut, 
collective settlements such as the kibbutz and state-planned immigration settlement, etc. Mapai 
then became Avoda (Labour).
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election initiated the shift from a founding Labour Zionist bloc to the more neoZi-
onist, neoliberal Likud party (Shafir and Peled 2004) – and a more complex stratifi-
cation of Israel society along socioeconomic, political, ethnic and religious divisions 
(Berthomière 2004). Yet the real neoliberal turn, which led to the actual withdrawal 
of the state and reduced public expenditure, occurred in 1985, under pressure from 
the US Government (Kay 2012).
The country’s shift to a more neoliberal approach to government and the econ-
omy still holds today. The elections that took place when I started my doctoral 
research in 2013 confirmed this trend. The winning coalition was made up of parties 
that all believed in a free market, the reduction of taxes, the cutting of welfare sub-
sidies, the weakening labour unions and, in general, supporting the withdrawal of 
the state (Rubin et al. 2014). However, the neoliberalisation of Israel does not mean 
that other ideologies do not subsist.
The impact of these reforms on Israel’s immigration policy has been two-fold: 
first, since the 1980s, immigrant integration shifted from being the responsibility of 
the state to self-responsibility through the implementation of ‘direct absorption’ 
(Doron and Kargar 1993); second, de facto decentralisation meant an increased role 
of cities in different planning domains (Ben-Elia 2006; Razin 2003).
The direct absorption policy stipulates that new immigrants receive a six-month 
allocation from the state, as well as different discounts for residential, local and 
income taxes, the purchase of cars or electric appliances, and university fees; these 
various entitlements are known as the ‘absorption basket’. Most immigrants are no 
longer directed to state housing nor employed in state enterprises but are free to 
choose where to settle and must rely on their own networks to find a job. In that 
context, the Government had to find new incentives – notably through housing proj-
ects  – to attract newcomers to the peripheral cities suffering from out-migration 
(Berthomière 2002). The direct absorption policy mostly concerns Western immi-
grants –those from Ethiopia or India, for instance, are still directed to absorption 
centres and receive support for access to housing in specific neighbourhoods listed 
by the Government (Anteby 1998).
Decentralisation has meant that municipalities, including those in development 
towns, increased their autonomy when it came to immigrant settlement (Auerbach 
2001, 2011; Desille 2017; Tzfadia 2005, 2006; Yacobi and Tzfadia 2009). In this 
sense, municipal immigrant integration policies are the result of three types of log-
ics which are in tension: state logics, immigrant logics (represented by certain 
 political parties such as Shas10 and Israel Beitenu11 for instance) and the interests of 
the cities themselves (Desille 2017).
10 ‘Shas (Sephardic Guardians of the Torah) was originally formed in Jerusalem in 1983 with the 
support of Rabbi Schach, and led by Rabbis Ovadia Yosef and Aryeh Deri. Shas aimed at repre-
senting Sephardic Jews in Israel, as well as facilitating their access to resources to carry out their 
activities. It has a social agenda, particularly successful in a context of welfare vacuum. Their suc-
cess surprised the leaders themselves. But Shas has been extremely resilient and has managed to 
secure a diverse base of voters up to today” (Desille 2017, p. 138).
11 ‘In 1995, refuznik and Soviet immigrant from the 1970s Natan Sharansky founded the Russian 
right-wing party Israel beAliyah (a pun meaning ‘Israel on the rise’ as well as ‘Israel in immigra-
tion’). At the 1996 elections, half of FSU immigrants voted for this party, securing seven seats in 
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8.5  Description of the Study
To understand the underlying logics leading to the development and framing of 
local immigrant integration policies, I have selected four development towns (estab-
lished or expanded in the 1950s to absorb new immigrants and secure the new bor-
ders of the state): Acre, Arad, Kiryat Gat and Kiryat Shmona, located on the map in 
Fig. 8.1.
The four cities belong to the same urban hierarchy: they are middle-sized cities 
(20,000 to 50,000 residents), remote from the Tel Aviv–Jerusalem axis, economi-
cally depressed (with an indicator of 4 or 5 on a scale of 10),12 and have some 
regional function, notably in terms of service delivery. Second, the local political 
landscape of each city is quite similar, with the same political parties dominating 
local politics: Likud, national religious and religious parties, and Israel Beitenu 
party (Israel Beitenu council members are usually in charge of immigration issues). 
Finally, the cities residential bases are similar, constituted, as they are, mostly of 
African and Asian immigrants and their descendants from the 1950s onwards’ 
waves of immigration, as well as a large group of former-USSR immigrants 
(between 16 and 40%).
However, their planning and development followed different rationales. Acre is 
not explicitly a city established for immigration settlement purposes, since it is a 
very ancient site and was a Palestinian settlement until 1948. However, it has been 
greatly expanded to receive immigrants from the 1950s onwards. Today, it repre-
sents the most proactive city among the four under scrutiny when it comes to immi-
gration settlement issues. Kiryat Shmona was established in 1949 and Kiryat Gat in 
1955 for the settlement of new immigrants. Both development towns were estab-
lished on the sites of Palestinian villages which were entirely destroyed; however, 
unlike Acre, there are no Palestinian residents in these cities. Arad, a second- 
generation new town, was established in 1962, with new planning criteria to over-
come the socioeconomic issues that quickly surfaced in development towns such as 
Kiryat Gat and Kiryat Shmona. Although Kiryat Gat and Arad have formulated 
the parliament. Following political conflicts, Israel beAliyah was to disappear to leave Israel 
Beitenu (Israel our house) to enter the political scene. The Moldavian immigrant Avigdor 
Lieberman founded Israel Beitenu in 1999. It represents Russian-speaking immigrants and is pri-
marily secular, nationalist, Zionist and adopts a hawkish position with regard to the conflict” 
(Desille 2017, p. 139).
12 The socio-economic rank is calculated for each city depending on the financial resources of the 
residents (from work, benefits etc.). These are housing (the density, quality, and other components 
of this aspect), home appliances (e.g. air conditioners, personal computers and VCRs), the motori-
sation level (quantitative and qualitative), schooling and education, employment and unemploy-
ment profile, various types of socio-economic distress and and demographic characteristics. 1/10 
indicates cities in distress while 10/10 indicates well-off one. Based on these indicators, budgets, 
national transfers and staff decisions impacting on local governments are taken by the Ministry of 
the Interior.
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Fig. 8.1 Map of Israel
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some local immigration policies, Kiryat Shmona remains reluctant to direct its lim-
ited municipal resources towards new immigrants.
Additionally, their leadership, in the sense of the political style of the mayor and 
the city council (administrative bureaucracy, New Public Management, intermedi-
ary/hybrid), is also different. Acre and Kiryat Gat have adopted a more managerial 
approach, characterised by partnerships with the private sector and the business-like 
management of several public issues. Both the history of the places as well as the 
motivation and management style of their leaders are major causes leading local 
immigration policies to diverge (Desille 2017).
Whether they were involved or not in immigration settlement, political repre-
sentatives and technical staff in all four cities formulated some definition of inte-
gration during our encounters. Based on 60 interviews, I analysed the narratives 
and discourses underlying the concept of immigrant integration, with the aim of 
providing a grounded theory to this loaded concept. As Rinus Penninx (2013, 
p. 18) suggests:
The essence of policies is their intention to guide and steer processes in society – in our case 
processes of immigrant integration. Explicit policies are part of a political process of a 
normative nature in which the topic of integration is formulated as problem. The problem is 
given a normative framing (What do we want to be the outcome of the integration process?) 
and concrete actions are designed and developed to reach the desired outcome. Therefore, 
the systematic study of policies should investigate the framing and normative elements as 
well as practice and what relation these have (or do not have) with the process of integration 
as empirically measured. Ideally, this should be done using a terminology that is indepen-
dent of policy concepts.
Through in-depth encounters, I sought to reveal the ideas and beliefs that framed 
municipal immigrant integration policies in the cities, aside from the definition pro-
vided by the more explicit national policies I have mentioned in the earlier sections 
(the Law of Return, the direct absorption policy and the community absorption 
policy). My results show that ethnonational frames of citizenship, elaborated at the 
national level, persist and are reproduced at the local level. However, the rescaling 
of integration policies also has two effects; it permits local governments to have a 
wider margin for manœuvre to include a multicultural agenda whereby immigrants 
are given more freedom to preserve their sociocultural practices while, at the same 
time, privileging the settlement of immigrants who are perceived as more 
 contributing or desirable based on their so-called economic utility (a process similar 
to that in certain European countries, shown by Hinger 2020).
8.6  The Ethnicisation of Integration Paths: Between Moral 
Obligations and Economic Development Imperatives
On the topic of immigrant integration, participants in my research identified several 
opportunities linked with immigration. First and foremost – and based on a Zionist 
ideology – the incoming of Jewish individuals is associated with an ideal of territo-
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rial and community regeneration. For these depressed cities, immigrants hold the 
promise of ‘new blood’, a ‘revolution’. This promise is concretely operationalised 
through five ideas: (1) they not only enable socioeconomic development, (2) a 
demographic boost in areas suffering from out-migration and (3) cultural diversity 
but also (4) increase the political weight of previous immigrant groups and (5) pro-
vide new channels for public funds.
The active involvement of certain municipalities in reaching out to potential 
Jewish immigrants allows these cities to gain a degree of control over the profile of 
those who settle there. In particular and in order to contribute to the various aspects 
I have cited above (economic development, demographics, cultural diversity), 
immigrants targeted by these policies are expected to have a high level of education, 
to be of working age and to bring ‘culture’ (which implies the dual meaning of 
Western liberal attitudes and knowledge of the arts – music, literature, theatre and 
so on). In this context, the best-suited candidates are usually ‘Western’ Ashkenazi 
immigrants and, more particularly here, Former Soviet Union (FSU) immigrants 
(since these cities already host large numbers of the latter).
FSU immigration is highly correlated with educational credentials. Interviewees 
mentioned a wide array of topics in which FSU immigrants are believed to excel: 
the sciences, university teaching and research, but also applied technology, maths, 
chemistry and physics. As the director of the municipal economic corporation of 
Kiryat Shmona argues: ‘All the teachers of maths, music, chemistry and physics are 
immigrants. They did something great to Kiryat Shmona’.13 They are perceived as 
having higher numbers of trained individuals in the fields of medicine, computing 
and engineering. It is, in fact, true that FSU immigrants are relatively better edu-
cated: the Central Bureau of Statistics reports that 50 per cent of the FSU immi-
grants who arrived after 1990 hold academic degrees (CBS 2013). Nevertheless, 
many degrees are not automatically recognised and their holders have to sit equiva-
lent exams on arrival in Israel, leading many of them to give up on their previous 
career. Similarly, some professions are absent from the Israeli labour market, includ-
ing types of engineering (forestry, heavy metal) which are virtually non-existent in 
Israel. Altogether, it is estimated that only 34 per cent of newcomers continue to 
work in the same profession as in their home countries (CBS 2013). In this sense, 
Jewish immigration to Israel meets similar challenges to those confronted by other 
types of return migration, such as those discussed by Karolak in this volume.
The second dimension associated with FSU immigrants, and Western immi-
grants in general, is culture, including music, literature, cinema and even sport. In 
the 1990s, FSU immigrants, particularly the intelligentsia (understood as members 
of a cultural and literary elite back in Russia) and supported by state institutions, 
therefore invested considerable efforts in fostering a vibrant cultural environment, 
which was usually segregated and Russian-speaking (Remennick 2003; Storper- 
Perez 1998). Daniele Storper-Perez has documented these initiatives in Jerusalem 
and, while large cities were certainly hosting more of these initiatives than the small 




cities of the periphery, I have met members of the intelligentsia who have invested 
time and effort in activating their contacts with Russian-speaking artists and recreat-
ing their homeland cultural life in Israeli development towns (including the organ-
isation of weekly salons, from the 1990s onwards, dedicated to poetry recitals, 
concerts and other cultural events). Nowadays, providing cultural activities in their 
native tongue to Russian-speaking immigrants is one of the main tasks which 
municipal departments for immigration and integration take upon themselves and 
for which they can easily obtain state funding. Arad’s community worker explains:
If you want to attract more immigrants, you organise lectures that are not in Hebrew. Most 
of the immigrants here are FSU immigrants, from Russia, who are Russian-speakers. If you 
want to attract them, you need something in their language. Among all these immigrants, 
there are many elderly people who don’t even speak Hebrew. They speak only Russian. So 
for the Golden Age month, we organise activities that target this population.14
Closely concomitant with the pressure on individuals to be productive, their ability 
and willingness to participate in the workforce was highly appreciated by my inter-
viewees. FSU immigrants are perceived as possessing such attributes – they are hard 
workers with a serious work ethic who do not mind the downward mobility often 
experienced by immigrants on arrival. Acre’s deputy mayor argues:
They taught us what it is to come to work or not to come to work. People used to come to 
work, just to be at work. They came to work. They jumped on every job. They worked in 
everything to keep going.15
Nevertheless, the capacity of FSU immigrants to enter the labour market – com-
pared to previous waves of immigration – seems to be concomitant not with a so- 
called natural inclination for hard work but with the accession of Israel to the circle 
of industrialised countries. The Israeli economy of the 1990s offered better oppor-
tunities than that of the 1950s and 1960s. Secondly, FSU immigrants benefited from 
the direct absorption policy, whereby they could, at least in theory, choose where to 
live and move closer to economic centres. Thirdly, family structure was also a fac-
tor, as FSU immigrants belong to smaller, usually multigenerational families in 
which the elderly can take care of the children, providing more possibilities for 
parents to participate in the labour market (Lewin-Epstein et  al. 2003; Lipshitz 
1998; Tzfadia 2006).
Although there are considerable differences between FSU immigrants in terms 
of their geographic origin (ranging from Ukraine to Uzbekistan), their education, 
their previous occupations etc., the ‘Russians’ have a fairly stereotyped profile and 
are perceived to be educated, consumers of cultural activities, hardworking, ‘people 
of the system’ with high representation in the politics of Israel etc. In short, the 
‘Russians’ are idealised as ‘active, participatory and productive individuals’ (Soysal 
2012, p. 11). In a world that promotes lifelong education, employment at any cost 
and self-involvement in civil society (ibid.), such individuals could ultimately 
replace the state where it has withdrawn. As Glick Schiller and Çağlar (2010, p. 17) 
14 Interview conducted on 02 June 2015 with a community worker, Arad municipality.
15 Interview 3 conducted on 07 January 2015 with the Deputy Mayor, Acre municipality.
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state: ‘Local authorities upheld migrants as models of self-reliant survival without 
support from state services and programmes’.
What is striking, though, and strongly differs from the narratives collected, is 
that local governments do not put in place specific mechanisms, infrastructure or 
support systems to enabling them to benefit from immigration (such as providing 
efficient entrepreneurship training (only available in Hebrew today), making avail-
able commercial spaces, easing bureaucratic processes, etc.). A naïve belief in an 
‘in-place economy’16 persists in which immigrants are mere taxpayers. On top of 
paying taxes, immigrants constitute a demographic boost in those ‘shrinking cities’ 
suffering from out-migration. Their presence enables the maintenance of public ser-
vices and the channelling of new resources for the municipality.
However, the cities also host quite considerable numbers of Jews who immi-
grated recently from Africa and Asia, especially Ethiopian and Indian Jews and FSU 
immigrants from Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan. In Acre – and in Kiryat Gat 
in particular – interviews with the Mayor, the Deputy Mayor and the city’s spokes-
person show that these cities are open to Jewish immigrants from the Global South. 
For instance, the Mayor of Acre is proud of the achievements of the population of 
Mountain Jews — immigrants from Azerbaijan who, in other cities, usually fall into 
the category of undesirable immigrants. He confirms that the mechanisms set up to 
facilitate their participation in the various city institutions have worked: pupils excel 
in schools and adults participate in the workforce.17 However, this type of immigra-
tion is usually associated with the moral obligation incumbent upon the Jewish 
people: cities must provide for those residents, based on solidarity which stems 
from their belonging to ‘one people’. Here, the vulnerability narrative that I exposed 
in the first section of this chapter becomes more prominent.
At the policy level, the integration of immigrants from the Global South is con-
ceived of somewhat differently: instead of direct absorption, these immigrants have 
to settle in absorption centres before they can rent a home or access property. They 
usually undergo a conversion to Orthodox Judaism if their practice is not considered 
proper by the religious authorities. In general, they are the objects of an assimila-
tionist approach, with the absorption of the group rather than the individual and with 
similar logics of renunciation of agency which I described earlier. Finally, the immi-
grant status is ‘inherited’ and second-generation immigrants continue to benefit 
from special entitlements (discounts in education and enrolment in special units in 
the army in particular). In addition to the variation in the absorption approach, when 
it comes to discourses, the perceived benefits of these immigrants are linked to the 
potential funding which local governments can obtain to serve these populations.
In general, there is a trade-off between economic performance and multicultural-
ism – understood as individual choice over socio-cultural life. In fact, individuals 
16 Coined by French geographers Christophe Terrier and Laurent Davezies in the expression ‘écon-
omie présentielle” or ‘économie résidentielle” which we translated as ‘in-place economy”, the 
approach implies focusing on the area’s residents, who produce and consume, rather than on the 
industrial economy.
17 Interview conducted on 10 February 2015 with Shimon Lancry, Mayor of Acre.
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perceived as economically useful can ‘buy’ their cultural freedom, whereas groups 
from the Global South accepted by the cities are framed according to their potential 
vulnerability and strongly racialised. It is precisely this vulnerability that makes 
them deserving but it also means that the assimilationist injunction is stronger. In 
this sense, it seems to fit Chauvin and Garcés-Mascareñas’ (2014) concept of 
deservingness. Moreover, it points to a certain neoliberalisation of Israel’s integra-
tion frames, such as Will Kimlycka’s ‘neoliberal multiculturalism’ (2015) in which 
immigration is seen as positive for groups who do not threaten the redistributive 
systems of the states hosting them.
By actively categorising African and Asian Jewish immigrants as vulnerable, 
these policies and the discourses they are based on participate in their continuous 
exclusion from a new model of integration in Israel. Ethiopian and Indian new 
immigrants undergo a similar process of disintegration as the Mizrahi did some 
decades earlier. This fragmented integration governance has effects on urban soci-
ety as a whole. For instance, police violence and limited immigration quotas have 
triggered important protests in Tel Aviv, in Jerusalem and in cities with a significant 
group of Ethiopian Israelis (such as Kiryat Gat) in 2016. In parallel, the criminalisa-
tion of other racialised groups, such as asylum-seekers from Sudan and Eritrea, has 
again encouraged debates on ethnicisation and integration.
8.7  Conclusion: Reframing of the Deserving vs Desirable 
Dichotomy under Neoliberalisation Processes
Israel’s immigration policy and the concomitant integration policies elaborated by 
the state since the 1950s, have always borne exclusion mechanisms. Firstly, it com-
pletely excludes non-Jewish immigrants from access to the national community. 
Even the goal of the ‘encompassing of all Jews’ has always been restricted to indi-
viduals who could prove that they would quickly participate in building the ‘Jewish 
home’. Individuals who were not perceived to be economically useful could enter 
the country if they were under immediate threat  – thereby fitting instead the 
 definition of refugee – and were accepted because of their very vulnerability and 
obliged to assimilate with the European Ashkenazi model. This was true before the 
establishment of Israel – when the first groups of Jews arranged to reach mandatory 
Palestine at the establishment of the state – and is still true today. However, what 
makes the last decade different is the justification of this limitation: the rationale 
behind this disintegration within inclusion is increasingly linked to neoliberal 
reforms of governance.
Although Berthomière (2002) suggests that the FSU immigration in the 1990s, 
after Israel had shifted to a free market economy, would reveal the tensions between 
state logics and immigrant logics, I argue that the devolution of responsibilities to 
the city level, and the rescaling of power, had an equally important weight on the 
reframing of the integration paradigm. The logics at work are therefore threefold: 
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the state, the city and the immigrants. In fact, the development imperative that falls 
on municipalities, in a context of ‘interlocality competition’ (Brenner 2004) for 
resources, residents and more, has sanctioned immigration as a potential lever for 
development. The ethnicisation of Israel’s integration policies is dissimulated under 
an injunction to local economic development, where municipalities privilege certain 
immigrants because of their perceived economic utility. More insidious still, the 
neoliberal approach to integration participates in the reinforcement of ethnicisation, 
rather than its transformation. As Collyer et al. (2020) argue in the introduction of 
this volume, ‘the perception and practices of integration depend on the dominant 
perception of nationhood. […] this also works the other way around – integration 
policies that officially target only specific groups or individuals often serve as an 
arena in which the broader issue of belonging (or not) to the nation is (re)negoti-
ated’ (p. 12).
With this in mind, some local governments proactively design programmes to 
reach out to immigrants whom they perceive as ‘desirable’ and able to integrate bet-
ter and faster in the local community and the local economy. In this sense, the Law 
of Return, when interpreted at the local level, includes a criterion of economic per-
formance and self-responsibility for integration, whereby immigrants rely on their 
own capacity to learn the language (Hebrew courses are still subsidised) and look 
for housing and employment (including being involved in professional retraining if 
necessary). Western immigrants, and particularly, here, FSU immigrants, are 
believed to have sufficient social and human capital to deal effectively with their 
settlement and contribute to the city’s growth.
However, this does not mean that the ethnonational frame of integration, the 
belonging to the Jewish people, is no longer a fundamental aspect of immigrant 
integration: ethnonationalist frames persist. In this context, at the national level, all 
Jewish candidates for immigration are legitimate but the less they are perceived as 
net contributors – and therefore the more they are seen as vulnerable – the more they 
are subjected to an assimilationist injunction. There is still an economic aspect to 
welcoming groups from Ethiopia or India for instance: municipalities are assured of 
receiving substantial funds to support the groups’ integration, thereby effectively 
gaining money. However, the ministry officers and the municipal agents I inter-
viewed adopt a much less pluralist attitude towards them. The national ideological 
frame of integration is more prevalent for groups who go through absorption centres 
and do not benefit from direct absorption.
The case of Israel’s development towns brings some elements to the understand-
ing of politics of (dis)integration, as addressed in this collective volume. Firstly, 
new actors in the governance of immigrant integration – here local government’s 
officials and public service workers – actively participate in reframing integration. 
Secondly, even in the conception of a return policy, strongly justified by ethnon-
ational criteria, integration is conceived differently based on country of origin and 
assumed economic utility. Ethnicity, and the strong stereotyping associated with it, 
is the only determinant for the Jewish Agency, the ministry in charge of immigration 
matters and the municipalities to decide whether or not an immigrant is ‘desirable’ 
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and will therefore benefit from ‘direct absorption’ – which ensures the migrant’s 
free choice of sociocultural practice, geographical settlement and employment – or 
‘deserving’ and hence subject to community absorption, often associated with reli-
gious coercion, group professional retraining and job placement, as well as restricted 
choice of residence.
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